فَانطَلَقا حَتّىٰ إِذا لَقِيا غُلامًا فَقَتَلَهُ قالَ أَقَتَلتَ نَفسًا زَكِيَّةً بِغَيرِ نَفسٍ لَقَد جِئتَ شَيئًا نُكرًا
So they went on. When they encountered a boy, he slew him. He said: ‘Did you slay an innocent soul, without [his having slain] anyone? You have certainly done a dire thing!’
EXEGESIS
Zakiyyah (innocent) is the feminine of zakī which is another term for the active participle zākī meaning the one who keeps pure and clean from sin and wrongdoing. Kisāʾī suggests that zakiyyah and zākiyah are words of two different dialects, while Abū ʿAmr suggests that the latter is one who does not sin while the former is one who sins and repents. However, this suggestion is contrary to the purport of this verse and especially to the verse 19:19. At any rate, it means here that he has not committed any wrongdoing because he was still a child and had not reached the age of accountability.
Nukr (dire) means something reprehensible that is difficult to bear and is unknown or strange, like in the verse, The day when the caller calls to a dire (nukur) thing (54:6).
Some have said that nukr is less emphatic than the previous condemnation of monstrous (in verse 71), because killing one person is less evil than a ship full of people. Others have said that nukr is more emphatic because a ship can be repaired, but a lost life cannot be brought back; or because imr is the possibility of losing life, while nukr is actual loss of life.
Considering the actions though, it is clear that killing the child is the worse of the two, and any reasonable person would react more strongly to that because of the direct impact and the emotional element involved in it.
EXPOSITION
Khiḍr (a) was satisfied with Moses’ (a) explanation, accepted his apology, and allowed him to continue traveling with him. After all, he knew that Moses’ (a) reaction was a spontaneous response to an unexpected situation.
So they went on: there is without a doubt some omission here of their travels; coming ashore, leaving the ship, and traveling for some time.
When they encountered a boy, he slew him: Khiḍr (a) slew the boy. Apparently the fa in faqatalahu should indicate that he killed the boy without any provocation, almost as soon as they met him. There are various views and reports given as to how he killed the boy, but such details are unimportant.
He said: ‘Did you slay an innocent soul, without [his having slain] anyone?’: in other words, you did not kill him as retribution or prescribed punishment (ḥadd), nor some other reason that merits his killing. Some have considered this to be evidence that he was not a child, because a child would not ordinarily kill anyone, nor would they be held accountable for retribution if they did. It seems though to be more of an exclamation rather than pointing out a possibility of accountability, as if an alarmed Moses (a) declares: ‘Why would you kill an innocent child? He has harmed no one!’
The fact that he was distraught and greatly moved by the apparent horror he had just witnessed caused him to also forget his promise of not questioning Khiḍr’s (a) actions. Angrily he vented: You have certainly done a dire thing!
REVIEW OF TAFSĪR LITERATURE
Various details have been mentioned in exegetical works regarding the boy, such as his name, the name of his parents, what the boy used to do, and so on. All of these seem to be mere speculation and are contradictory, and do not merit mention.
Some have claimed he was not a boy at all but a young man, and have said things such as he was a highwayman who robbed people, and so on. This seems unlikely as certainly Moses (a) would not have reacted the way he did to the killing of a highwayman. Also, if he was indeed a robber, then it should have been mentioned as one of the reasons for him being killed when Khiḍr (a) eventually explains his actions, whereas the justification Khiḍr (a) gives is his fear that he would lead his parents to rebellion and disbelief, and that he wished the parents to be given a better child instead.
It seems these claims are forwarded to avoid the problematic nature of killing the boy, since the punishment for highway robbery can be a capital one. As we said, this is contrary to reason and the apparent meaning of the verse. If we understand the verse correctly, we should realise that killing the child by the act of God through the agency of Khiḍr (a) is not a crime, as we explained earlier (see also the commentary on verses 80-81). That is why once Khiḍr (a) explains it to Moses (a) later, he is satisfied with the wisdom of his actions.
The statement of Moses (a), Did you slay an innocent soul, without [his having slain] anyone is of course reference to the law of retribution (qiṣāṣ), as we mentioned earlier. We are told that this law was written for the Jews in the Torah: We sent down the Torah containing guidance and light … And in it We prescribed for them: a life for a life, an eye for an eye (5:44-45).
This could be taken as evidence that these events occurred after the revelation of the Torah, since Moses (a) is judging by the same principles. Such a conclusion would be hasty though, since the law of retaliation is a natural and divine law that predates the revelation of the Torah. Indeed, when Moses (a) is commanded to go back to Egypt – long before the revelation of the Torah – he interjects, Also, they have a charge against me, and I fear they will kill me (26:14), referring to him killing an Egyptian man and fearing that they will not give him a fair trial and use it as an excuse to kill him.
Thus, retaliation being prescribed (katabnā, lit. we wrote) for the Jews in the Torah can be seen as officialising it for them as God’s law in His book, which they must follow.
TOPICAL ARTICLE
Khiḍr (a) and Utility in Divine Law
The story of Khiḍr (a) and Moses (a) raises a very important point about Quranic meta-ethics. The explanations given by Khiḍr (a) in verses 79-82 show that Quranic morality is firmly consequentialist, however the rulings of the shariah itself are seemingly absolute and apparently do not give room for any sort of utilitarian consideration: A faithful man or woman may not, when Allah and His Apostle have decided on a matter, have any option in their matter (33:36); Those who do not judge by what Allah has sent down – it is they who are the faithless (5:44); All the response of the faithful, when they are summoned to Allah and His Apostle that He may judge between them, is to say, ‘We hear and obey’ (24:51).
Is there a contradiction between these two? To answer this, we must first point out that all of the rulings of the shariah are designed in general for the maximum benefit of the servants of God as individuals who are part of a larger community. Furthermore, it is important to keep in mind that unlike modern western utilitarianism, Quranic consequentialism is not simply material, but rather it gives primary importance to man’s true interest and benefit: his hereafter, and hence gives heavy consideration to his spiritual well-being as well, whilst not ignoring his material well-being either. So for example when Islamic law prohibits fornication, it does not do so only on the basis of its material harms, but also by considering its spiritual consequences.
Also as we mentioned it sees each individual as part of a community, and therefore considerations of utility (maṣlaḥah) do not just weigh what is in the benefit of the individual, but consider its larger consequences on society. So fornication is not prohibited just because it is damaging to the individual, which it is, but also because of the effects it has on all of society.
However, as the central theme of Sūrat al-Kahf demonstrates, all these harms and benefits – spiritual, material, individual, communal – are not known to man, and therefore he must submit to God’s command and the divine law. He cannot know the final consequences of an action nor all its possible outcomes, therefore he must submit to the command of the one who does. To do otherwise would be to claim independence from God and refuse to submit to Him, which would be the greatest harm (mafsadah) and bring inevitable perdition.
Does this mean that utilitarian consideration is completely alien to Islamic jurisprudence? No, in some cases the qualified jurist (mujtahid) or even the responsible individual (mukallaf) may act contrary to some rulings for the sake of utility. For example, if one is starving and has no choice, they may resort to eating carrion or swine. If a jurist deems that a mosque should be moved for the sake of some important public project, he can rule so. However, both examples are based on principles found in the sources of Islamic law and they are not contrary to the general maxims of the shariah. The first scenario is for example covered in the Quran when God declares excepting what you may be compelled to [eat] (6:119). The latter is based on the jurist’s deeper understanding of the overarching objectives of the shariah (maqāṣid).
However, some rulings are inviolable and cannot be justified with anything, one of those is killing an innocent, which is equated in the Quran to killing all of humanity (5:32) and therefore there is nothing that may be used to justify it as being for the sake of the greater good, even if one reached certitude about the beneficial utilities of such an action, since God declares that nothing can outweigh the sanctity of an innocent life. The case of Khiḍr (a) killing the boy should therefore not be understood only as him acting for the sake of utility or the knowledge that allowed him to reach such an understanding – even though in verses 80-81 he clearly explained the utility behind his action – but rather it is him being the agent of the will and decree of God.
As we said, the decree of God is not simply looking at material benefit, but rather based on His cosmological will and plan, Indeed We have created everything in a measure (54:49). Everything that happens is measured and decreed by God in order that His plan regarding the purpose of creation should be fulfilled in the best possible way, Who perfected everything that He created (32:7). The purpose of this worldly existence is to test God’s servants so that they may be prepared for the hereafter. As such many events will occur which serve that purpose. Things that we may superficially deem as loss, trial, tribulation, which may seem contrary to utility and material benefit, are in fact beneficial for man’s spiritual and overall growth (of course much of that loss is also attributable to evil use of free will, which is another discussion). Children dying is a tragic reality of everyday life, and this story wishes to teach us that there are deeper considerations at work in the divine decree regarding such matters.
In summary, it is true that Khiḍr (a) was acting on divine knowledge of utility (what the scholars have deemed the bāṭin), and Moses (a) was acting on shariah (ẓāhir). This is why Khiḍr (a) was correct in his action, but Moses (a) too was correct in objecting to it. Both were done in submission to the will and command of God.
[1] Shawkani, 3/357.
[2] Tibyan, 7/75; Tabari, 15/185; Baghawi, 3/207; Mizan, 13/345.
[3] Raghib, p. 824.
[4] Zamakhshari, 2/736.
[5] Baghawi, 3/208.
[6] See Furqan, 18/155.
[7] It is said he killed him by cutting his throat with a knife, or that he slammed him into the ground and then decapitated him, or that he kicked him forcefully, or banged his head against a wall (Tabrisi, 6/747; Thalabi, 6/184; Zamakhshari, 2/736).
[8] Tabari, 15/185; Baghawi, 3/208; Furqan, 18/156-157.
[9] Razi, 21/486; Mizan, 13/345.
[10] Muhit, 7/208; Mizan, 13/345. Makārim Shīrāzī takes a more indeterminate position on the matter, saying that the verse itself does not clearly prove him being either of age or underage (Nemuneh, 12/493).
[11] For example Razi, 21/491; Alusi, 8/334.