Al-Nūr – Verse 5

إِلَّا الَّذينَ تابوا مِن بَعدِ ذٰلِكَ وَأَصلَحوا فَإِنَّ اللَّهَ غَفورٌ رَحيمٌ

Excepting those who repent after that and reform, for Allah is indeed all-forgiving, all-merciful.

EXEGESIS 

Aṣlaḥū (reform) is the plural verb from iṣlāḥ, which means to bring about ṣalāḥ. Ṣalāḥ is the opposite of fasād (corruption) and means that which is not corrupted. Iṣlāḥ then means to make good that which was corrupted.‎[su_tooltip content=”Tahqiq, 6/267, ṣ-l-ḥ; Raghib, pp. 489-490, ṣ-l-ḥ.”][1][/su_tooltip]

EXPOSITION

This verse mentions those who are exempted from the designation(s) of the previous verse and the conditions for them being exempted.

Excepting those who repent after that: this exception is said to refer to the statement and never accept any testimony from them after that in the previous verse. This means that those who repent afterwards then their testimony will once again be accepted, whether or not they have been punished with the eighty lashes for false testimony or not. So those who insist on their accusation after having been punished and refuse to take back their words, will not have their testimony accepted.‎[su_tooltip content=”Tibyan, 7/409; Tabari, 18/60-61. Ṭūsī attributes this opinion to the Ṣādiqayn. Ṭabarī reports that ʿUmar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb said to Abū Bakrah that if he repents he would accept his testimony. They both as well attribute it to many early Muslim exegetes and jurists.”][2][/su_tooltip] What is more apparent though is that the exception also includes and they are transgressors, as well. In other words, if they have sincerely repented then their testimony should be accepted and they shall not be deemed transgressors anymore.‎[su_tooltip content=”Tabari, 18/62-64; Mizan, 15/81-82.”][3][/su_tooltip] This is because if they are no longer considered transgressors, there is no reason to reject their testimony.‎[su_tooltip content=”Nemuneh, 14/371.”][4][/su_tooltip] This is also the interpretation given in many reports from the Imams.

It has been suggested that the exception also refers to the command of punishing them eighty lashes as well, meaning the one who repents is no longer a transgressor, nor should their testimony be disregarded, nor should they be punished.‎[su_tooltip content=”Zamakhshari, 3/214. Tanṭāwī and Subḥānī assert that all the scholars agree that the exception does not include the punishment (Tantawi, 10/86-87; Munyah, 19/82). Linguistically, an exception that is preceded by several sentences may apply to either the last one, or all of them. Context clues should then discern to us which one is intended (Mizan, 15/82). Although some have disagreed saying it should refer to the latest statement only, unless there are context clues suggesting otherwise (Nemuneh, 14/371). See 5:33-34 for an example of an exception that does not only refer to the statement immediately preceding it.”][5][/su_tooltip] More commonly the forgoing of the punishment has been made contingent on the victim of the slander forgiving the slanderer.‎[su_tooltip content=”Baghawi, 3/382.”][6][/su_tooltip]

As such, it is generally considered that repentance means to withdraw the accusation, and he should publicly admit he lied,‎[su_tooltip content=”Tibyan, 7/409; Tabari, 18/60-63.”][7][/su_tooltip] especially in front of those to whom he had related the accusation.‎[su_tooltip content=”Nemuneh, 14/374.”][8][/su_tooltip] This is because by withdrawing the accusation one can negate or at least mitigate some of the damage done to the reputation of the person that has been slandered.‎[su_tooltip content=”Tantawi, 10/87-88.”][9][/su_tooltip] In fact, insistence on the accusation even after the person has been punished with eighty lashes can be cause for further discretionary punishment.‎[su_tooltip content=”Najafī, Jawāhir al-Kalām (Beirut: Dār Iḥyāʾ al-Turāth al-ʿArabī, 1362 AHS), 41/427.”][10][/su_tooltip] Repentance always entails attempting to right the wrongs one has done. It is not feasible that one should publicly slander someone and then privately repent for it.‎[su_tooltip content=”Nemuneh, 14/374.”][11][/su_tooltip] This is also what is mentioned in the reports from the Imams.

And reform: reform (aṣlaḥū) is a transitive verb the object of which is elided. It most likely means those who reform their actions. As such, making amends for corrupt actions is an essential part of repentance. To reform is to not return to the same sin. To reform is to seek to be better in the future and avoid similar mistakes. To reform is to make up to those that one has wronged.

Some have argued based on this that before the slanderer’s testimony can be accepted, some time must be allowed to pass after the repentance, so that the reformation of the person becomes established.‎[su_tooltip content=”Razi, 23/329.”][12][/su_tooltip] Others have said that this refers to them taking back their accusation,‎[su_tooltip content=”Munyah, 19/82-83.”][13][/su_tooltip] or that they reform their actions.‎[su_tooltip content=”Mizan, 15/81.”][14][/su_tooltip]

For Allah is indeed all-forgiving, all-merciful: repentance may or may not be accepted, it is not incumbent for God to accept a person’s repentance. Nevertheless, because He is all-forgiving, all-merciful, He will accept the sincere repentance of His servants.‎[su_tooltip content=”Razi, 23/330.”][15][/su_tooltip]

INSIGHTS FROM HADITH

  1. From Qāsim ibn Sulaymān, that he asked Imam al-Ṣādiq (a) about a man who has slandered another man and then been lashed for it and then has repented and no other evil is known about him, whether his testimony is accepted? To which the Imam replied: ‘Yes; what have you heard?’ He said: ‘They say that his repentance is between him and his Lord, and his testimony will never be accepted.’ The Imam then said: ‘What a terrible thing they claim! My father used to say that if he repents and nothing but good is known of him his testimony is accepted.’‎[su_tooltip content=”Kafi, 7/397; Istibsar, 3/37, h. 125. Kulaynī reports the same opinion from Imam Ali (a) as well.”][16][/su_tooltip]

Note: The opinion that Qāsim ibn Sulaymān relates here is what has been quoted in the next section.

  1. From Muhammad ibn Sinān, that he asked Imam al-Ṣādiq (a) regarding the one who repents after being punished with the ḥadd, is their testimony to be accepted? The Imam replied: ‘If he repents; his repentance entails that he takes back what he has said and belies himself in the presence of the Imam and the Muslims. If he does that then the Imam should accept his testimony after that.’‎[su_tooltip content=”Kafi, 7/397-398; Itibsar, 3/36, h. 121.”][17][/su_tooltip]

Note: A similar sentiment is in many other reports as well. There is only one report that says his testimony should never be accepted,‎[su_tooltip content=”Istibsar, 3/37, h. 127.”][18][/su_tooltip] but scholars have given different explanations for that report.‎[su_tooltip content=”See for example Istibsar, 3/37; Nemuneh, 14/372.”][19][/su_tooltip]

REVIEW OF TAFSĪR LITERATURE

Some scholars have argued that the exception of this verse is not referring to and never accept any testimony from them after that, but rather to and they are transgressors. Meaning that they will remain in the state of transgression until they repent, however their testimony will never be accepted. This was famously the opinion of al-Qāḍī Shurayḥ who commented: ‘His repentance is between him and his Lord, but we do not allow his testimony.’‎[su_tooltip content=”Tibyan, 7/409; Tabari, 18/61-62; Zamakhshari, 3/214. Tanṭāwī also relates that this was the opinion of Abū Ḥanīfah, but adds that the majority of the scholars disagree with that (Tantawi, 10/87). Subḥānī prefers this opinion over the others, but adds that authentic narrations say his testimony can be accepted (Munyah, 19/82).”][20][/su_tooltip]

Zajjāj has reportedly criticised this, saying that the one guilty of slanderous testimony is not worse than the disbeliever, and the disbeliever will have their testimony accepted after accepting Islam, so too the repentance of the slanderer should be accepted.‎[su_tooltip content=”Tabrisi, 7/199. Zamakhsharī points out that if a disbeliever slanders someone and then becomes a Muslim, his testimony is to be accepted. However, he says this is not a valid criticism, since slander from a disbeliever is far less damaging to a Muslim’s reputation than slander from another Muslim, since the enmity of the disbeliever is known (Zamakhshari, 3/214).”][21][/su_tooltip]

Ṭabrisī also offers a critique saying that the one who is guilty of slanderous testimony is not worse than the one who actually engages in the act of zināʾ (fornication/adultery) itself. The fornicator’s testimony is accepted if they repent, so why should the slanderer’s not be accepted.‎[su_tooltip content=”Tabrisi, 7/199.”][22][/su_tooltip]

Rāzī says that the only reason for the rejection of testimony is that the slanderer has become a transgressor; therefore, even if the exception only refers to that then the removal of the status of transgressor would allow their testimony to be once again accepted.‎[su_tooltip content=”Razi, 23/328.”][23][/su_tooltip]

[1] Tahqiq, 6/267, ṣ-l-ḥ; Raghib, pp. 489-490, ṣ-l-ḥ.
[2] Tibyan, 7/409; Tabari, 18/60-61. Ṭūsī attributes this opinion to the Ṣādiqayn. Ṭabarī reports that ʿUmar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb said to Abū Bakrah that if he repents he would accept his testimony. They both as well attribute it to many early Muslim exegetes and jurists.
[3] Tabari, 18/62-64; Mizan, 15/81-82.
[4] Nemuneh, 14/371.
[5] Zamakhshari, 3/214. Tanṭāwī and Subḥānī assert that all the scholars agree that the exception does not include the punishment (Tantawi, 10/86-87; Munyah, 19/82). Linguistically, an exception that is preceded by several sentences may apply to either the last one, or all of them. Context clues should then discern to us which one is intended (Mizan, 15/82). Although some have disagreed saying it should refer to the latest statement only, unless there are context clues suggesting otherwise (Nemuneh, 14/371). See 5:33-34 for an example of an exception that does not only refer to the statement immediately preceding it.
[6] Baghawi, 3/382.
[7] Tibyan, 7/409; Tabari, 18/60-63.
[8] Nemuneh, 14/374.
[9] Tantawi, 10/87-88.
[10] Najafī, Jawāhir al-Kalām (Beirut: Dār Iḥyāʾ al-Turāth al-ʿArabī, 1362 AHS), 41/427.
[11] Nemuneh, 14/374.
[12] Razi, 23/329.
[13] Munyah, 19/82-83.
[14] Mizan, 15/81.
[15] Razi, 23/330.
[16] Kafi, 7/397; Istibsar, 3/37, h. 125. Kulaynī reports the same opinion from Imam Ali (a) as well.
[17] Kafi, 7/397-398; Itibsar, 3/36, h. 121.
[18] Istibsar, 3/37, h. 127.
[19] See for example Istibsar, 3/37; Nemuneh, 14/372.
[20] Tibyan, 7/409; Tabari, 18/61-62; Zamakhshari, 3/214. Tanṭāwī also relates that this was the opinion of Abū Ḥanīfah, but adds that the majority of the scholars disagree with that (Tantawi, 10/87). Subḥānī prefers this opinion over the others, but adds that authentic narrations say his testimony can be accepted (Munyah, 19/82).
[21] Tabrisi, 7/199. Zamakhsharī points out that if a disbeliever slanders someone and then becomes a Muslim, his testimony is to be accepted. However, he says this is not a valid criticism, since slander from a disbeliever is far less damaging to a Muslim’s reputation than slander from another Muslim, since the enmity of the disbeliever is known (Zamakhshari, 3/214).
[22] Tabrisi, 7/199.
[23] Razi, 23/328.