وَقالوا لَو شاءَ الرَّحمٰنُ ما عَبَدناهُم ۗ ما لَهُم بِذٰلِكَ مِن عِلمٍ ۖ إِن هُم إِلّا يَخرُصونَ
They say: ‘Had the All-Beneficent wished, we would not have worshipped them.’ They do not have any knowledge of that, and they do nothing but surmise.
EXEGESIS
Yakhruṣūn (they surmise) comes from the infinitive kharṣ, which means to conjecture and estimate. Originally, it was used in the context of estimating the quantity of fruits, such as the number of dates on a palm tree. It was then used in a wider context to include all forms of conjecture that are not based on solid reasoning or firm foundations.
One group of lexicographers state that kharṣ can mean ‘a lie’, and kharrāṣūn (as in 51:10) means liars. This view is adopted in the translation of Yusuf Ali: ‘Of that they have no knowledge! They do nothing but lie!’
Others state that it is not correct to literally construe kharṣ as a lie. However, since it is often the case that one’s estimations and conjectures do not turn out to be in line with reality, this word also began to be used to mean a lie. As such, kharṣ can either be used to mean conjecture or lie, and it is the context that helps in identifying the intended meaning.
EXPOSITION
The preceding verse challenged one of the core beliefs held by the polytheists, namely their assumption that angels are female. This subsequent verse tackles the polytheists’ practice of worshipping angels, thereby broadening the scope of the argument to encompass not only their beliefs, but also their actions.
They say: ‘Had the All-Beneficent wished, we would not have worshipped them.’ Their argument can be construed in a logical formulation as follows:
Premise 1: if God had intended for us to refrain from worshipping angels, we would not be able to worship them, as God’s will is always realised.
Premise 2: we do worship angels.
Conclusion: therefore, God did not intend for us to refrain from worshipping angels, and our ability to worship them implies that God has granted us permission to do so. See also 6:148 and 7:28.
Some exegetes suggest that this line of reasoning indicates that the polytheists also subscribed to a form of compulsion (jabr), in that every belief and action that emanates from man is due to the will of God.
They do not have any knowledge of that, in other words, this argument is based on ignorance, as it is nothing more than a logical fallacy, whereby the existential will (al-irādah al-takwīniyyah) of God has been confused with His legislative will (al-irādah al-tashrīʿiyyah). The existential will of God is that which is reflected in the verse, All His command, when He wills something, is to say to it ‘Be,’ and it is (36:82). The existential will of God is always realised and is not conditioned upon any other thing. It governs the entire corpus of existence, and no creature has the will or choice to violate it. An example would be God’s will for man to develop in the wombs, or to have free will. In this man has no ‘choice’ or ‘option’, and it is impossible for God’s will not to be realised. The legislative will of God, however, denotes the precepts ordained by God with which the human being ought to comply voluntarily by practicing his free will. By definition, this type of will is not always realised and is dependent on man’s use of his free will in order to comply with the commandments of God.
The polytheists’ argument is flawed because it fails to distinguish between God’s existential will and legislative will. Their belief that their ability to worship angels implies God’s permission for them to do so, is based on the assumption that God’s will is always realised, which is true only for God’s existential will.
However, God’s desire for angels not to be worshipped falls under legislative will – a set of divine commandments intended to guide human conduct. The legislative will requires voluntary compliance and is not always realised, as humans possess free will to either follow or disregard these divine precepts. Consequently, the polytheists’ argument conflates these two forms of God’s will, leading to an inaccurate conclusion.
Concerning divine legislation, God’s will has consistently emphasised that only He should be worshipped, He does not approve of disbelief for His servants (39:7) (see also 16:36). The argument that God permits the worship of angels is further challenged in verse 7:28, which asserts that worshipping anyone other than God is reprehensible: Indeed, Allah does not enjoin indecencies. Do you attribute to Allah what you do not know? These passages demonstrate that God’s legislative will is explicitly against the worship of any being other than Himself.
According to Mujāhid, the pronoun them in we would not have worshipped them refers to the idols and not the angels. Some exegetes have supported this understanding by noting that the pronoun them in ʿabadnāhum (worshipped them) is masculine, whereas the previous verses explicitly mentioned that they believed the angels to be females; therefore, if the verse was referring to worship of the angels, it would have been more appropriate to say ʿabadnāhā or ʿabadnāhunna.
REVIEW OF TAFSĪR LITERATURE
Some exegetes have suggested that the claim of the polytheists, Had the All-Beneficent wished, we would not have worshipped them, was actually a form of confession. In other words, the polytheists were confessing that their worship of angels was a blameworthy act, but through this argument they considered themselves to be absolved and excused.
However, it appears improbable that the polytheists acknowledged the error of their ways, as subsequent verses suggest that they continued to justify their actions by appealing to ancestral tradition (see verse 22).
As for those exegetes who hold deterministic theological views, they have proposed several explanations in response to the apparent contradiction between their beliefs and the implications of this verse. Some argue that the phrase They do not have any knowledge of that refers specifically to the claim in the previous verse that angels are female, rather than addressing the broader issue of determinism. Others maintain that the polytheists’ argument was meant as mockery, and thus the verse merely critiques their intentions, not the content of their argument.
Yet another group of deterministic exegetes have attempted to reconcile their beliefs by distinguishing between God’s will and God’s command. They argue that the verse does not refute the notion that God wills disbelief for certain individuals, but instead challenges the idea that it is evil or unjust for God to command these disbelievers to have faith, given His predetermined will.
According to some exegetes, the conclusion of the argument made by the polytheists is ‘and therefore we shall not be punished for worshipping them’, which is implicit in the verse. Based on this understanding, the phrase They do not have any knowledge of that is a response to this conclusion and means ‘they do not have knowledge of the punishment that has been ordained for them’.
[1] Amthal, 16/32.
[2] Tahqiq, 3/47.
[3] Ayn, 4/183; Maqayis, 2/169; Lisan, 21/24.
[4] Tahqiq, 3/47.
[5] Amthal, 16/32.
[6] Mizan, 18/91.
[7] Amthal, 16/31.
[8] Suyuti, 6/15.
[9] Ibn Ashur, 25/231.
[10] Alusi, 25/62.
[11] Qurtubi, 16/74; Razi, 27/627.
[12] Qurtubi, 16/73; Razi, 27/627.
[13] Razi, 27/627.
[14] Muhit, 9/366.